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Another Look at the EEC Judgments
Convention: Should Outsiders Be
Worried?
Bruce M. Landay*
I.

Introduction

The fear of being haled into an alien forum is neither new nor
unique to citizens of the United States. During the development of
the American federal court system, concern about prejudice
prompted the creation of diversity jurisdiction.' In those days, the
United States seemed bigger and distant states more foreign.
Europeans have attempted to minimize the dangers of prejudicial legal predicaments in foreign states by means of a tradition of treaties
and conventions, conferences at the Hague, and the workings of the
European Economic Community (EEC). These treaties and conventions demonstrate that although the world has grown smaller, effort
is still necessary to allay the fears of litigants everywhere that the
interests of fairness can be served only in their home forum. Cooperation among legal systems has increased and must continue to do so,
but it would be naive to dismiss the current potential for unfair legal
situations abroad.
In 1968, when the EEC member states signed the Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (EEC Judgments Convention), 2 giving "full faith
and credit" to the judgments of member states,3 there was great apprehension in the American legal community.4 It was feared that
European theories of "exorbitant" jurisdiction5 would now be invoked against American parties, with the resulting judgments en* B.A. Yale 1983, J.D. Georgetown 1987. Associate, Kaplan Russin & Vecchi, Washington, D.C. Visiting Attorney, Magrone, Pasinetti, Brosio & Casati, in Milan, Italy.
I. J. Landers & J. Martin, Civil Procedure 194, 199-201 (1981).
2. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil & Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, arts. 26-30, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR., translated in 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH)
6003, BII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (Sweet and Maxwell)
BI 1-041 [hereinafter EEC Judgments Convention].
3. Id. arts. 26-30.
4. For examples of the degree of apprehension felt by commentators, see Nadelmann,
infra note 47, at 418, 419; Kerr, The EEC Judgment Convention: Some Repercussions Beyond the EEC, 15 EUROPARECHT 353, 356 (1980); von Mehren, infra note 54, at 1060.
5. See infra p.2, section I A.
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forceable throughout the EEC. This apprehension was not unfounded, for the EEC Judgments Convention specifically allowed for
the use of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction against domiciliaries of
countries outside the community,' while protecting EEC domiciliar7
ies from such practices.
This article gives new consideration to the EEC Judgments
Convention as it applies to exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. It explains the workings of these bases of jurisdiction and the concerns
that they engender for parties outside the EEC. The article first examines the more traditional responses to the enforcement of exorbitantly based judgments, such as bilateral treaty negotiation, and the
never-applied Hague Convention Draft (the Hague Draft).8 The
events leading to the signing of the EEC Judgments Convention and
the demise of the Hague Draft are then considered. 9 Although the
EEC Judgments Convention has not yet produced the untoward results American lawyers anticipated, American interests are still
threatened by the potential use of the Convention to enforce exorbitantly based judgments. This article concludes with a discussion of
possible remedies which address that threat.
II.

Historical Background

A.

Exorbitant Bases of Jurisdiction

Two bases of jurisdiction used in certain western European
countries have long been regarded by the common law legal community as "exorbitant." 10 Most prominent in the EEC today is jurisdiction based upon the nationality or domicile of the plaintiff," which
has its origin in article 14 of the French Civil Code.' 2 The other well
known form of exorbitant jurisdiction is found in section 23 of the
6. EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
7. Id. art. 3.
8. Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, 15 AM. J. COmP. L. 361, 362 (1967) [hereinafter Hague Draft]. The
convention has never entered into force between any two countries. See infra note 74.
9. Surprisingly, the United States has not concluded a single agreement with EEC member states to protect American litigants from exorbitantly based judgments.
10. The terms "exorbitant" and "excessive" are used interchangeably to refer to the
bases of jurisdiction described in this section. Giardina, The European Court and the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 263, 264 (1978).
I1. Domicile as a civil law concept (habitual residence) may differ slightly from that of
British Common Law (domicile of origin, choice, or dependency). Mendes, The Troublesome
Workings of the Judgments Convention of the European Economic Community, 13 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 82-85 (1980).
12. The French Civil Code of 1804 states: "L'6tranger, mme non r6sident en France,
pourra 6tre cite devant les tribunaux francais, pour l'Execution des obligations par lui contract6es en France avec un Francais; il pourra Etre trahit devant les tribunaux de France, pour des
obligations par lui contract~es en pays 6tranger des Francais." CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 14
(1804). The French Civil Code is translated in J. CRABB, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (1977).
See Carl, The Common Market Judgments Convention - Its Threat and Challenge to Americans, 8 INT'L LAW. 446, 447 (1974).
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German Code of Civil Procedure, which confers jurisdiction upon a
German court over a defendant whose assets are present in
Germany.3
The French article 14 jurisdiction is quite simple: a French national may sue anyone in a French court. The nationality or domicile
of the defendant, or his complete lack of contact with the forum are
irrelevant to imposition of jurisdiction under this article. The site of
the occurrence that is the subject matter of the action at hand is also
irrelevant to article 14 jurisdiction.14 The possible consequences of
this provision are obviously far-reaching. 15
One may speculate that article 14 was enacted because a powerful Napoleonic France regarded its courts as the only proper fora for
litigation involving one of its citizens. 6 The power of the French led
in large part to the widespread adoption and adaptation of the Napoleonic Code, including article 14, elsewhere in Europe."7
Since that time, however, many European countries have restricted the breadth of article 14 jurisdiction. Belgium was one of the
first countries to reduce the use of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction,
deleting article 14 from its code as early as 1876.18 The only remaining trace of the prior law was a "retaliatory" provision, which enabled a Belgian to invoke jurisdiction against a foreigner upon any
basis which would have been available to that foreigner against a
Belgian under the foreigner's own law. 19 Italy has enacted a similar
13. ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] § 23, 1877 (Ger.).
14. C. Civ. art. 14 (Fr.).
15. As an example, if a French tourist in New York is involved in a car accident with a
New Yorker, the New Yorker could find himself the defendant in a French proceeding. It is of
no import that the New York driver has never been to France and has no contacts there. Carl,
supra note 12, at 448.
16. See C. Civ. art. 15 (Fr.). Article 15 states, parallel to this discussion of article 14,
that a French national (no matter where domiciled) may be called before a French court for
obligations he incurs in another country, even towards an alien. This jurisdiction is considered
exclusive, and a French court would therefore not recognize any foreign judgment against a
Frenchman. Carl, supra note 12, at 448.
17. Luxembourg's Civil Code provides for the same basis of jurisdiction. C. Civ. art. 14
(Lux.) (1807). The Netherlands was early in adopting the same provision, but since has
slightly changed the jurisdictional basis to the domicile of the plaintiff. CODE CIV. PROCEDURE
[CODE Civ. P.] art. 126(3) (Neth.) (1938), as discussed in Carl, supra note 10, at 448;
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The
Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 (1967). (Professor Nadelmann, deceased, formerly professor emeritus at Harvard Law School, and a participant in the Hague
Conference negotiations (see infra p. 4-5 section 11(B)), has made numerous contributions to
an understanding of the background and significance of the EEC, Hague and other judgment
conventions. His work has been of great value to the author in the preparation of this article.)
R. SCHLESINGER. COMPARATIVE LAW 315-16 (1980).
18. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 999. Belgium does retain article 15, identical to its
French counterpart. C. Civ. art. 15 (BeIg.) (1973). For the French counterpart, see supra note
16.
19. For example, a Belgian could sue a Frenchman in Belgium using "article 14" jurisdiction only because the Frenchman could do the same to the Belgian within French jurisdiction. Law on Jurisd. of March 25, 1876, arts. 52-54, Pasinomie (Belg.), as discussed in
Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1014.
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reciprocity clause."
The second major form of exorbitant jurisdiction, section 23 of
the German Code of Civil Procedure,2 1 confers upon German courts
in personam jurisdiction over any defendant who owns assets in Germany. The resulting judgment is not limited to the amount of these
assets, nor is there a minimum amount of such assets necessary to
invoke Section 23 jurisdiction. 2 Like its Napoleonic counterpart,
German Section 23 jurisdiction has been imitated in several countries.2 3 However, among EEC member states, only Germany and
Denmark have this type of jurisdiction. 4
B. Protections Against Excessive Bases of Jurisdiction
Before the signing of the EEC Judgments Convention, an
American or other party could ordinarily manage his assets to avoid
20. C.P.C. art. 4(4) (It.) (1942). For instance, an Italian national might sue a French
national in Italy because of the plaintiff's Italian nationality. Were the same Italian plaintiff to
sue a Dutchman, whose own law recognizes jurisdiction based upon the plaintiff's domicile (as
opposed to nationality), the Italian plaintiff would also have to be domiciled in Italy. In fact,
any domiciliary of Italy, whether or not an Italian national, could sue the Dutchman in Italy.
But this same reciprocity provision would not allow the invocation of excessively based jurisdiction against an American because the United States does not have such a basis of jurisdiction in its law. The French Code's influence, of course, was not limited to Europe. (For a
discussion of the bases of jurisdiction which American and European law share and those
which they do not, see Carl, supra note 12, at 446-48).
21. ZPO § 23 (1877) (Ger.).
22. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 999. See U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 322-23 PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 4 (2d ed. 1972).
23. See generally Nadelmann, supra note 17 at 1011. The following countries have initiated jurisdiction of the same type as German section 23 jurisdiction: Denmark: CODE CIv. P.
(Lov Om Rettens Pleje) § 248 (Den. 1916, amended 1936), as cited in A. PHILIP, AMERICANDANISH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 25 PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE
LAW, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 7 (1957). This commentator
states: "Danish law does not know the common law distinction between jurisdiction in personam and jurisdiction in rem. A. PHILIP, supra, at 24. Austria: Jurisdictions-Norm § 99
(1895), as cited in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1011 n.102. Japan: CODE CIV. P. § 17
(1890), as cited in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1011 n.103. Sweden: CODE CIV. P. (Rattegangsbalk) Ch. 10, § 3(l) (1942), as cited in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1011 n.106. For a
discussion of the section 23 concept with respect to debt obligation, see R. GINSBURG & A.
BRUZELIUS. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 184-85 (1965). Switzerland: Only some cantons
have bases of jurisdiction of the German section 23 type. See M. Guldener, Schweizerisches
Zivilprozessrecht 89 (2d ed. 1958) as cited in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1011 n.104. The
canton of Bern has followed the example of German Section 23. Bern ZPO at 25 (July 17,
1918), as discussed in A. NUSSBAUM, AMERICAN-SWISS PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49
PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE

LAW, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW No. 1 (1958).
24. Article 4 of the Accession Convention (see infra note 55) modifies the EEC Judgments Convention, art. 3, so as to exclude bases of jurisdiction under Scottish law that are
similar to art. 23: immovable property in Scotland or the attachment of any property in Scotland. See Report . . . to the Convention on Jurisdiction . . . P. Schlosser, O.J. Comm. Eur.
C59, Mar. 5, 1979, at paragraph 86. The Convention of Accession the Hellenic Republic to
the European Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community, infra note 127,
art. 3, similarly modifies the EEC Judgments Convention so as to exclude art. 40 of the Greek
Code of Civil Procedure. Art. 40 allows jurisdiction over foreign defendants holding assets in
Greece, but only in suits having such assets as their object. Id.
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the exorbitantly based jurisdiction of a European court.25 Moreover,
some countries typically would not recognize exorbitantly based
judgments.16 However, additional protections were still needed by
potential litigants based in Europe likely to do business in neighboring countries that exercised exorbitantly based jurisdiction. Thus,
long before the advent of the Common Market, Europe had a significant history of bilateral treaties aimed at limiting the enforcement of
these judgments.27
Germany negotiated several judgment recognition treaties when
its own experience with Section 23 jurisdiction began to sour. The
German Code of Civil Procedure bases its recognition of foreign
judgments on reciprocity requirements. One such reciprocity requirement dictates that the foreign court must have jurisdiction "according to German Law."' 28 Thus, in 1891, the German Reichsgericht
(highest court) held that an Austrian decision against a German

domiciliary, with jurisdiction based upon the presence of his assets in
Austria, had to be enforced in Germany. 29 Germany first approached
Austria for treaty negotiation. A treaty was signed between the two
countries in 1923, barring enforcement of Section 23 judgments by
the requested country if rendered in default, or if the defendant had
limited his appearance to the amount of his assets present in the
forum." More recently Germany concluded a similar treaty with
Greece. 3 1
Belgium had early success in treaty making, encouraged by its
legislation in the nineteenth century of retaliatory reciprocity provisions.32 The French undertook negotiations with the Belgians soon
after the 1876 enactment of the new Belgian legislation, and a treaty
on the recognition and enactment of judgments was signed in 1899. a1
25. For example, one could be a judgment debtor in France and run a substantial business operation in Italy without any danger of Italian enforcement of the French decision
against him.
26. Carl, supra note 12, at 449.
27. See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 997 n.16. For examples of such bilateral treaties,
see: Treaty for the Further Simplification of Judicial Relations, Aug. 30, 1962, Netherlands-West Germany, 500 U.N.T.S. 3 (1964); Convention Concerning the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judicial Decisions and Other Enforceable Instruments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Apr. 6, 1962, Belgium-Italy, 490 U.N.T.S. 317 (1964).
28. ZPO § 328(1) (1877) (Ger.), as quoted in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1012.
29. Judgment of May 15, 1891, Reichsgericht, 2d Civ. Serv., Ger., 1891 Juristische
Wochenschrift [JW] 334 (No. II) as discussed in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1012 nn.10910.
30. Treaty between the German Reich and the Austrian Republic Regarding Legal Protection and Assistance, art. 25(3), June 21, 1923, Austria-Germany, 27 L.N.T.S. 69, 79-80;
Treaty of June 6, 1959, art. 2(4), 1960 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBI.Ill] 1246 (still in
force), as discussed in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1012 n.1 11-12.
31. Treaty of Nov. 4, 1961, art. 3(4), [1963] BGBI.lI 109, 111, as discussed in
Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1013 n. 113. See also supra note 24.
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. Convention Between Belgium and France Relative to the Enforcement of Judgments, July 8, 1899, Belgium-France, 187 Parry's T.S. 378, 1900 Pasinomie (Belg.) 329, as
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This pact barred the use of article 14 in France against Belgians,
thereby forestalling the impact of Belgium's reciprocity provision on
French litigants. 4 Soon after, Belgium and the Netherlands signed a
treaty eliminating the Use by the Dutch of exorbitant jurisdiction
against Belgians.3 5
The Belgians also executed a treaty with Germany in 1958,

which made German section 23 judgments unenforceable against
Belgian domiciliaries but recognized the enforceability of these judg-

ments against parties from other countries.3" It remains uncertain
why the Belgians conceded any recognition at all to section 23, 31 in
light of their clear and longstanding position against exorbitant bases

of jurisdiction.
III.

38

Judgment

Conventions

as Protection

Against

Exorbitant

Jurisdiction
A.

"Recognition" and "Double" Type Conventions

Two basic types of conventions have been implemented for the
purpose of judgment recognition: the "recognition" convention, and
the "double" convention.3 9 The simple "recognition" convention articulates the conditions under which a foreign judgment will be recognized by the petitioned court. These requirements typically include
proper notice to the defendant, and jurisdictional criteria40 that must
be satisfied if the judgment is to be recognized.41 The "double" convention provides the standards for recognition found in the "recognition" type convention as well as rules for assumption of original judiscussed in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1014 n. 121.
34. Even more progressive was the 1904 case of Marychurch et Cie. v. Compagnie Maritime Francaise, in which the Belgian Cour de Cassation refused to recognize a French article
14 judgment against an English party. Cass. 2e, July 1, 1904 Pasicrisie Beige 1 293, 319
[1904] Belgique Judiciare 1329, 1346, I REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVf 166 (1905)

as discussed in Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1014, 1015.
35. Convention Between Belgium and The Netherlands Concerning Territorial Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy, and the Authority and Execution of Judgments, Arbitral Awards and Notarial Acts, March 28, 1925, Belgium-Netherlands, 93 L.N.T.S. 443, as cited in Nadelmann,
supra note 17, at 1015.
36. Convention Concerning the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions, Arbitral Awards and Authentic Acts in Civil and Commercial Matters, June 30, 1958,
Belgium-Netherlands, 1960 Pasinomie (Belg.) I119, 387 U.N.T.S. 245 (1961), as discussed in
Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1014 nn. 117-118.
37. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1014.
38. Id. at 1014-15.
39. Id. at 998.
40. For example, a simple "recognition" convention might restrict bases of jurisdiction
for recognition purposes, excluding article 14 type jurisdiction while allowing jurisdiction over
a resident of the forum, but would not provide for the problem of non-recognition of decisions
based on article 14 legitimately rendered in that forum. A "double" convention would fill this
gap created by simple "recognition" conventions.
41. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 998. For an example of a "recognition" treaty, see the
German-Belgian Treaty of 1958, supra note 36.
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risdiction. 42 Under the "double" type convention no court may
entertain a claim unless these rules are followed. 43 "Double" conventions are obviously far more complex than recognition conventions,
and are therefore more difficult to negotiate, but they have the advantage of preventing states from rendering judgments which will
not be recognized outside that state. "Double" conventions thus save

time and embarrassment for the country of the judgment court, the
country of the enforcing court, and the litigants as well."
B. The Development of the EEC Judgments Convention and the
Hague Draft Convention
1. The EEC Judgments Convention.-The EEC Judgments
Convention was mandated by article 220 of the treaty establishing
the EEC."5 Article 220 provides that member states should negotiate
to ensure "the simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decision . . ."."The great
variety among the member states' laws governing the recognition of
foreign judgments and bases for assumption of original jurisdiction
led the EEC experts to draft this as a multilateral "double"
47
convention.
The EEC Judgments Convention was drafted to supersede bilateral judgment treaties then in force between the various member
states.4 8 This promised significant changes in the several national
policies regarding exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. After a long his42. E.g., the convention might require that a suit be filed in a court within the jurisdiction of the defendant's domicile or incorporation, or in the place of the contract or tort.
Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 998.
43. Id. Examples of double treaties are: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judicial Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters, April 17, 1959, NetherlandsItaly, 474 U.N.T.S. 207 (1963), and Convention Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judicial Decisions and other Enforceable Instruments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
April 6, 1962, Belgium-Italy, 490 U.N.T.S. 317 (1964).
44. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 998.
45. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 220, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 87 (1958), reprinted in
51 AM. J. INT'L L. 865, 930 (1957).
46. Id. Professor Nadelmann has stated that "simplification of formalities," as referred
to in the Treaty of Rome, was not needed so much as the reform of substantive law dealing
with recognition of foreign judgments. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 996.
47. Alternatives to a multilateral agreement might have included merely filling in the
gaps in the complex web of bilateral treaties already in force, or liberalizing the national laws
of the member states themselves. It has been suggested that a multilateral judgments convention already drafted by the Benelux countries provided encouragement for the EEC's choice.
Nadelmann, The Outer World and the Common Market Experts' Draft of a Convention in
Recognition of Judgments, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 409, 416 (1967-68) (citing Rapport sur
laConvention concernant lacompetence judiciare et l'ex6cution des d6cisions en mati6re civile
et commerciale, 6laborE par M.P. Jenard, C59 O.J. Comm. Eur. Mar. 5, 1979). The Benelux
Convention on the Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments,
Belgium-Luxembourg-Netherlands, Nov. 24, 1961, 1961 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden No. 16 (Neth.), was not yet in force in 1968, Luxembourg not having ratified it.
Nadelmann, supra at 417.
48. E.E.C. Convention, supra note 2, art. 55.
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tory of European effort to eliminate exorbitantly based jurisdiction,
EEC member states would finally prohibit altogether the use of such

jurisdiction against their domiciliaries. Thus, articles 2 and 3 of the
EEC Judgments Convention barred the use of exorbitantly based

jurisdiction."9
Under article 4 of the same document, however, the protection
afforded to EEC domiciliaries did not reach those domiciled outside
the EEC.5 0 By the terms of article 4, exorbitantly based judgments,

which might not have been recognized by a member state prior to
the adoption of the Convention, were now qualified for automatic

enforcement anywhere in the EEC.P1 This provoked some interesting
questions about member states' internal policies. For example,
Belgium, by acceding to the EEC Judgments Convention, effectively
overruled its long held policy against enforcement of exorbitantly
based judgments against litigants from third party countries, first
enunciated in Marychurch et Cie.52 An Italian court might even face
a constitutional question under the EEC Judgments Convention, because of Italy's stricture against the use of exorbitantly based jurisdiction except in the case of retaliation.5 3 The United Kingdom, as a

common law jurisdiction, may not have shared concepts of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction with other EEC members under civil law

jurisdiction,5" but having signed on to the EEC Judgments Conven49.

Article 2
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that
State.
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall
be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.

Article 3
Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the court of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules . . . of this Title.
Id. arts. 2-3.
50.
Article 4
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of
the courts of each Contracting State shall . . . be determined by the law of that
State.
As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Contracting State
may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those specified in the second paragraph of
Article 3, in the same way as the nationals of that State.
Id. art. 4.
51. Id. art. 26.
52. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1015. See supra note 34.
53. See supra note 20; Nadelmann, The Common Market Convention and a Hague
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV, L. REv. 1282, 1286 (1969). For a
discussion of Italy's refusal to recognize judgments inconsistent with its "public policy," see
infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
Certainly an important legal problem may exist: Prelegge 31 (General Provisions Regarding Laws) Codice Civile, Italy, forbids giving effect to any foreign law or act when such is
contrary to public policy. This expressly includes foreign judgments. See C.P.C. supra note 20,
at art. 797(7).
54. It should be noted that common law transient jurisdiction is an exorbitant basis of
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tion in 1978,5 the United Kingdom would now have to enforce EEC
judgments based upon these jurisdictional concepts. Although such
internal changes may have seemed troubling, the EEC Judgments

Convention did harmonize to some degree conflicts among the mem-

ber states. 6 Furthermore, such conflicts themselves ultimately became less important as article 3 provided that EEC domiciliaries
were to be protected from the harsh results of exorbitantly based
judgments. It was therefore clear that the parties with true cause for
worry were domiciliaries of countries outside the Community.
2.

The Hague Draft Convention.-Members of the Hague

Conference on Private International Law met in 1966 to work on
their own Draft Convention.5" These meetings provided a forum for
the fears of countries not in the EEC.58 The first such meeting took
place after the 1964 publication of the Common Market Draft. 9 At
that time there ensued debate between the Community members and
the other Hague delegates regarding the interplay of the two conventions."0 The Hague Draft was not to be enforceable between any two
states until they concluded a supplementary agreement to that effect.61 This provision was intended to allow greater opportunity for
jurisdiction to civil law minds. As such, this concept was added to the EEC Judgments Convention's article 3, which lists bases of jurisdiction not applicable to EEC domiciles, when the
United Kingdom acceded to the Convention. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of
Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European
Economic Community and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044, 1050 (June-Dec.
1981). See also supra note 24 regarding Scottish law exorbitant bases of jurisdiction.
55. Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments, Oct. 9, 1978, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 91 7011, BII-191
[hereinafter Accession Convention].
The Accession Convention will enter into force after the original EEC members and one
new member have each ratified it. Id. art. 39. The United Kingdom has enacted legislation to
prepare itself to do so, at which point the Accession Convention will enter into force two
months and one day later. BII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 91 BI 1-214.
56. von Mehren, supra note 54, at 1049.
57. Hague Draft, supra note 8. This was intended to be a multilateral convention with a
special bilateral agreement feature, see infra note 61.
58. Present at the previous Tenth Session held in October 1964, were all 23 members:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. (Only six were
EEC members, those marked in italics.) Nadelmann & Reese, The Tenth Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 612, 612 n.l (1964). At
the "Extraordinary Session," April, 1966, only Ireland and Yugoslavia were absent.
Nadelmann & von Mehren, The Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L. L. 803, 804 (1966) [hereinafter Nadelmann & von
Mehren].
59. Draft Convention Relating to the Jurisdiction of Courts and to the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, EEC Commission doc. no. 1437/IV/65 Rivista
di diritto internazionale privata e processuale 790 (1965). See generally Nadelmann, supra
note 17, at 1000.
60. See infra note 63-65 and accompanying text.
61. Draft Convention, supra note 8, art. 21 (at 366).

34

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 6:1

each contracting state to address areas of particular concern while
still maintaining the general uniformity of the law contained in the
Hague Draft. 62
At the Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference in April
1966, the Common Market countries asserted that the Hague Draft
should go even further, and allow regional groups to make their own
agreements, unbound by the terms of the Hague Document.6 3 The
EEC Hague delegates from outside the Common Market understood
this transparent reference to the EEC Judgments Convention to be
an indication that the EEC meant to preserve its exorbitant base of
jurisdiction vis-A-vis outsiders. In response, the American and British
delegations submitted "Working Paper No. 30", which proposed
that the Hague Draft include a provision against the enforcement
abroad of exorbitantly based judgments.6 4 Debate over this proposal
ended in the referral of this question to a Special Commission. 6
Before that Special Commission was able to meet in October 1966,
however, the EEC experts changed the course of discussion by adding a new provision, article 59, to. their draft of the EEC
Convention.66
C.

Article 59 of the EEC Convention: A Hollow Promise

Article 59 of the EEC Judgments Convention draft allowed for
bilateral treaties between EEC states and outsiders that barred the
use of excessive bases of jurisdiction. 7 Although article 59 was a
very encouraging sign that EEC states wished to settle the issue,
subsequent proceedings at the Hague indicated that it was meant
merely to be a bargaining chip for EEC members in negotiating the
status of their Judgments Convention.
Article 59's underlying purpose surfaced when the Hague Special Commission met in October, 1966. At that time, the Commission drafted a Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Draft (Supplementary Protocol),6 8 which listed exorbitant bases of jurisdiction and
62. Id. art. 23. See also Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1283.
63. See Nadelmann infra note 64, at 411.
64. Working Paper No. 30, Actes et documents, 1966, Conference de La Haye de Droit
InternationalPrivK 288 [hereinafter Actes et documents], reprinted in Nadelmann, The Outer
World and the Common Market Experts' Draft of a Convention on Recognition of Judgments, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 409, 419 (1968).
65. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1283-84. Interestingly, Belgium sided with the "outsiders" on Working Paper No. 30. Id. at 1286. The policies of the EEC states are far from
uniform in this area. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. The Working Paper was submitted on April 22, 1966. Working Paper No. 30, supra note 64, at 288. The conflict
threatened the success of the entire session, until late at night on the last day, April 26, when
the issue was delegated to the Special Commission. Nadelmann & von Mehren, supra note 58,
at 804.
66. EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, art. 59.
67. Id.
68. Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Draft, 15 AM. J. COMp. L. 369 (1967) [herein-
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denied extraterritorial enforcement of judgments founded on such
bases of jurisdiction. In the ensuing debate over whether the Supplementary Protocol should be mandatory for Hague Draft signers, the
EEC members were able to gather a majority of negative votes. 69
Having thus swept aside the greatest obstacle to the implementation
of their Judgments Convention, and its article 4, the EEC experts
redrafted article 59. Under the new draft, a bilateral agreement to
protect a non-member country from exorbitant jurisdiction under the
EEC Convention's article 4 had to be in the form of a convention on
the recognition and enforcement of judgments."0 This alteration
made potential negotiation under article 59 far more difficult. Essentially, article 59 was rendered ineffective.
Following the vote, the United States, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom reserved the right to reopen the question of the Supplementary Protocol's status. 1 In the meantime, the Common Market
countries signed the EEC Judgments Convention, with article 59 as
amended, on September 27, 1968, ten days before the meeting of the
Eleventh Session of the Hague Convention.7 2 This prior signing
closed the issue of the conflict between the Supplementary Protocol
and EEC law, as the EEC Judgments Convention now took
73
precedence.
Article 59 was further amended in 1978 by the Convention on
the Accession of Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark to the
EEC Judgments Convention. 4 Under the new provision added by
the amendment, no bilateral agreement under article 59 could affect
the enforceability of judgments based upon section 23-type jurisdiction (presence of assets) where the action was in rem or where the
after Supplementary Protocol].
69. See Nadelmann supra note 53, at 1284-85. One possible factor accounting for this
coup by the EEC may have been the negative votes of future community members. Professor
Nadelmann noted that countries contemplating joining the EEC were caught in a dilemma:
"If the Protocol were binding, then they [such countries] would not be able to use the Hague
Convention if they subsequently became members of the Common Market." However, "the
Protocol would protect them if they remained outside the Common Market." Nadelmann,
supra note 53, at 1285. Great Britain indeed appeared to support a mandatory Protocol. Concessions were made to EEC interests, though, probably in order to reach some consensus. See
Actes et documentes, supra note 64, at 478-86 (Proc~s verbal No. 10). The Supplementary
Protocol was in obvious conflict with article 4 of the EEC Judgments Convention, which all
new EEC members are required to sign. (EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, art. 63;
Treaty of Rome, supra note 45, art. 220.) At that time, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway were all contemplating accession to the EEC Treaty. (Nadelmann, supra
note 53, at 1285.) Remarkably though, France and Germany abstained from the vote on the
Hague Protocol. See id. at 1284; Actes et documents, supra note 64, at 491-92.
70. EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4, 59.
71. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1284; Actes et documents, supra note 61 at 491-92.
72. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1284-85.
73. Article 7 of the Supplementary Protocol reads: "This Protocol applies subject to the
provisions of existing Conventions relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments." Supplementary Protocol, supra note 68, at 370.
74. Accession Convention, supra note 55, art. 26.
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property involved constituted the security for a debt which was the
subject matter of the action. This change, though far less than the
first amendment to article 59, posed yet another limitation upon the
potential for meaningful negotiation of bilateral agreements with
states outside the EEC.
IV.

The Conventions Today

A.

The Hague Convention

The Hague Draft has never taken effect between any two countries.75 At least initially, the failure of the Hague effort probably
stemmed in part from the EEC requirement that all new member
countries accede to the EEC Judgments Convention." Another likely
factor was the vote making the Supplementary Protocol optional."
Although the original Hague Draft did not include a provision addressing the issue of excessive bases of jurisdiction, the subsequent
struggle between the EEC states and the non-EEC states over those
issues must have made clear to the non-EEC states the necessity of
the Supplementary Protocol. The Hague Draft without the Supplementary Protocol provided insufficient protection. Furthermore, some
states may have feared that if the Hague Draft did not bar enforcement of exorbitantly based judgments, such judgments would be enforced even outside the EEC. Absent very specific language in the
various bilateral supplementary agreements required of countries entering into the Hague Convention 7 8 there would be nothing to prevent such a result. The draft that emerged from the Supplementary
Protocol vote was too weak to garner the support of even the more
enthusiastic contributors to the Hague effort.7 9
B.

The EEC Convention

It is curious that the EEC states fought so strenuously to retain
their ability to use exorbitant bases of jurisdiction against outside
domiciliaries. 80 They may have done so in order to maintain bargain75. The Hague Convention is not effective between any two countries without a Supplementary Agreement under article 21. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. There are
three signatories to the Hague Convention. These countries, Cyprus, Portugal and the Netherlands, have also ratified this Convention on June 8, 1976, June 21, 1983 and June 21, 1979,
respectively. Information on file at Office of Treaty Affairs, United States Dept. of State.
Under article 28 of the Hague Convention, two ratifications are necessary for the Convention
to enter into force. No other ratification of the Hague Convention or Supplementary Agreements under article 21 have been made.
76. See EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, art. 63.
77. See supra note 69.
78. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
79. The Swedish delegate to the Hague Conference had foreseen that if the Convention
were drafted too weak to provide states with reasonable protection of their interests, these
states might refrain from ratifying. Actes etDocuments, supra note 61, at 484.
80. See supra notes 27-38 regarding previous efforts to minimize the effects of exorbi-
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ing power when negotiating treaties under article 59.81 However, the
EEC experts had amended article 59 into a "dead letter" by the
time the EEC Judgments Convention was signed, and it seems clear
that they had no intention of making it a viable basis of negotiation.82 Evidently, article 59 itself was the bargaining chip, and the
EEC experts perceived valid reasons to retain article 4 in the EEC
Judgments Convention. A report from the EEC Commission8" supplies some justifications for the EEC's retention of article 4's jurisdiction against outside domiciliaries:
- First, without article 4, a judgment debtor might avoid his
obligation simply by shifting his assets to another EEC country.84
This argument, however, does not account for the fact that the
courts of several European states were already in the practice of allowing assignments of claims to nationals of the defendant's
domicile.85
- Second, if exorbitantly based judgments were not enforced
against domiciliaries outside of the EEC, then a Community domiciliary could find himself without remedy anywhere in the Community.86 Had the motivation of the EEC experts really been to ensure
the availability of an EEC community forum for claims against
outside domiciliaires, a unification of jurisdictional criteria would
have been in order, giving all EEC states the use of exorbitant bases
of jurisdiction.
- Third, article 4 treats people equally, regardless of nationality, so long as they are domiciled in the Community. The exclusion
of outsiders from protection against exorbitant bases of jurisdiction
is not new. Such a framework was used in the conventions between
Belgium and France, Belgium and Holland, and the Benelux
treaty.8 7 Nevertheless, foreign interests are still unfairly threatened
by article 4, and past errors do not justify a similar error on a
grander scale. One domiciled outside the EEC still bears the risk of
exorbitantly based judgments originating in fora with which he has
tant bases of jurisdiction.
81. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1286-87.
82. von Mehren, supra note 54, at 1059 n.60.
83. Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, E.E.C. Bull. Supp. 12/72, at 36-38 [hereinafter Report].
84. Id. See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1002-03.
85. Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 1003. These countries include France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
86. Report, supra note 83, at 37. For example, the Netherlands has no "presence of
assets" jurisdiction. A Frenchman could have a claim against a Belgian, currently domiciled in
the United Sates, whose major assets are located in the Netherlands. If the Dutch courts did
not recognize judgments based upon French article 14 jurisdiction, then the Frenchman would
have no place to sue but the United States. However, this argument neglects the fact that a
German, who cannot avail himself of article 14 jurisdiction, would still have to sue the Belgian
in the United States.
87. Id.
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no relation being enforced against him anywhere in the EEC.
A fourth argument, though not suggested by the EEC report, is
frequently implied by a comparison of the EEC with the American
federal system, with its "full faith and credit" clause.8 8 The United
States often exercise jurisdiction on bases that Europeans regard as
insufficient, such as transient presence in the forum state.8 9 However,
these bases of jurisdiction can be distinguished from the EEC's exorbitant jurisdiction in that they apply equally to defendants from any
of the fifty states and foreign countries.
The EEC members may have indicated a willingness to compromise in 1968 by joining in the unanimous vote at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference favoring a "Recommendation Relating to the Connection Between the Convention . . . and the
Supplementary Protocol." 90 The recommendation encourages states
to sign both the Hague Draft and the Supplementary Protocol at
once, or, if that cannot be done due to prior treaty obligations, to
take all possible steps to comply with the principles of the Protocol.
While this vote was encouraging, in fact it has changed nothing.
Nearly two decades later the promise of article 59 agreements
brought by the recommendation has not materialized. Perhaps the
EEC delegates at the Eleventh Session were aware that the Hague
Draft would never take hold, and that their recommendation would
thus be meaningless; or they may have simply been willing to sign
yet another document, with which compliance would be completely
optional, in order to avoid further attention to their own refusal to
give up article 4. Yet, hindsight also demonstrates that excessive bases of jurisdiction have seldom been used in recent years, 91 and the
88. Mendes, supra note 11, at 78. The "full faith and credit" clause is U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1.
89. In fact, both the United Kingdom's and Ireland's equivalents of transient jurisdiction
are now considered exorbitant under art. 3 of the EEC Convention, supra note 2, as a result of
the Convention of October 9, 1978, on the Accession Convention, supra, n.55, and the Protocol
on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, O.J. EUR. COMM., L304/1, 1978, art. 4.
90. Recommendation Relating to the Connection Between the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Supplementary Protocol, Actes et Documents, 1968 (Tome I), Conference de La Haye de Droit
InternationalPriv at 110-13, reprinted in 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 602 (1968).
91. Indeed, article 4 of the Brussels Convention had not been invoked at all as of December 31, 1982. F. POCAR, CODICE DELLE CONVENZIONI SULLA GIURISDIZIONE E
L'ESECUZIONE DELLE SENTENZE STRANIERE NELLA C.E.E. (1980, with update 1983).
As of April 7, 1987, there had been no use of Article 4 recorded on the European Commission's database. Telephone interview with Auke Haagsma, Legal Advisor for the European
Commission, in Washington D.C. (April 7, 1987).
France, for example, very seldom if at all sought enforcement of any article 14 judgments
even in the years before the EEC Judgments Convention. (Nadelmann, supra note 17, at
1016.)
In Germany, even since the EEC Judgments Convention went into force on Feb. 1, 1973
section 23 has rarely been used. (McClellan & Kremlis, The Convention of September 27,
1968 on Jurisdictionand Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 20
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 529-30 (1983).) Furthermore, no German section 23 judgment has
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EEC states may well have been sincere in their recommendation
vote. Quite simply, the consequences so feared by the legal and busi-

ness community since the EEC Judgments Convention was published
have not ensued.9" The hearts of the European Community members
may not be in the perpetuation of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction
against non-member states.
Italian courts have recently demonstrated a willingness to deny

enforcement of decisions from countries with which Italy has recognition treaties when such enforcement would violate Italian public
policy.9 3 Although the EEC Judgments Convention's public policy
exception does not apply to the rules relating to jurisdiction,9 4 the
Italian Code of Civil Procedure prohibits recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment inconsistent with Italian public policy.95
In Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi,9 the Corte di Cassazione refused to enforce an English decision97 because to do so would
have been to enforce a contract which was in breach of Italian Ex-

change Control regulations.9" The Court of Appeals of Bologna has
followed the Terruzzi case, again based upon the Exchange Control
Regulations, in denying recognition to a French decision. 9 These de-

cisions do not pertain to exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, and it is not
at all clear that any EEC member would invoke the public policy
exception against their enforcement.
The EEC Judgments Convention has doubtless been of great
been enforced extraterritorially under the EEC Judgments Convention. (von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16
INT'L. LAW. 671, 673 (1982). von Dryander notes notes that § 23 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure can and has been invoked by foreign plaintiffs. In one interesting case, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company, New York, obtained the attachment of Iranian shares in the Friedrich Krupp GmbH. Amstgericht Essen (unpublished attachment order). Id. at 682, n.68.)
92. See supra note 4.
93. Abbatescianni, Recognition of English Judgments in Italy: the Terruzzi case, New
L.J., Feb. 22, 1985, at 179.
94. EEC Judgments Convention, supra note 2, arts. 27(I), 28; BII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (Sweet & Maxwell) 91 BI 1-202.
95. C.P.C. art. 797.
96. Wilson, Smithett & Cope, Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 1981, Corte cass. N. 4686, Italy, 1982
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE [R.D.I.PP. 107, cited in Abbatescianni, supra note 93, 179 n.2.
97. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, [1976] 1 All E.R. 817 (C.A.), cited in
Abbatescianni, supra note 93, at 179 n.l. The request for enforcement was made pursuant to
the Italo-British Convention of Feb. 7, 1964. Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 7, 1964, United KingdomItaly, 941 U.N.T.S. 173. See also Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 1982 R.D.I.P.P.
107.
98. The defendant, Terruzzi, had been unable to perform under a contract for the sale
of metals as the result of his faulty speculation of metal futures on the London market. Under
Italian regulation, a contract entailing a financial obligation toward a foreign resident requires
prior government authorization (see Presidential Decree of June 6, 1956 No. 476 [Italy], cited
in Abbatescianni, supra note 93, at 179). Abbatescianni, supra note 93, at 179.
99. Malanca Motori, S.p.A. v. Soci6t6 des 6stablissements B. Savoye, S.A., Apr.19,
1983, Corte app., Bologna, 1984-11 Giurisprudenza commerciale 76 as discussed in Abbatescianni, supra note 93, at 180 n.10.
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benefit to the EEC, despite persistent problems."' This Convention
is yet another sign of progress toward a stable, unified Western Europe. It has even been suggested that American negotiators would be

making a mistake in trying to obtain revision of article 4, since this
rule represents a step toward greater European cohesion, and thus a

stability in this area, "a stability which is surely in the interests of
the United States."1 0 1 This statement may be true, but in the opinion
of this author, it puts the cart before the horse - Americans and
other "outsiders" cannot wait for European stability to put an end to
the threat of article 4.
V.

The Need for Improvement

Although foreign judgments are routinely recognized by American courts, American judgments are more often denied recognition
than enforced by foreign governments.10 2 Even in a time of progressive judicial relations among EEC states, most European courts recognize American judgments grudgingly if at all. Courts of various
European states either reevaluate American decisions on the merits, 0 " completely refuse them recognition absent a treaty, or require
proof of reciprocity. Such proof of reciprocity naturally must be
made on the basis of common law decisions, and is difficult for a civil
law judge to accept. 0 4 Remarkably, despite our liberal policy in the
enforcement of foreign judgments, American interests in Europe remain as threatened by the EEC Judgments Convention now as they
were in 1968.
Few treaties have been concluded under article 59, none of
100. Mendes, supra note 9, at 104.
101. Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments: An Interim Update, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 442 (1977).
102. Carl, supra note 12, at 451; Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1288-89.
103. In French civil law, such review was called revision au fond. This doctrine is described in G. DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 PARKER
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE
TIONAL LAW 161-65 (1961). This doctrine still exists in Belgium. Carl, supra note

INTERNA-

12, at 451.
Foreign decisions are no longer subject to r4vision au fond in France, however. Munzer v.
Munzer-Jacoby, Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr., 1964.
In this case, the Cour de Cassation granted the execution of two foreign judgments. Plaintiff had obtained a New York divorce from defendant husband in 1926. In 1958, plaintiff
again successfully sued defendant in New York. This suit was for 28 years of unpaid alimony.
Defendant, meanwhile, had moved to Nice. The French Cour de Cassation enforced the New
York decisions without reviewing them on their merits. The Court set forth five grounds for
the enforcement: 1) that the foreign court had jurisdiction, 2) that regular procedure was
followed, 3) that proper law was applied according to French rules for conflicts of law, 4) that
the decision conformed with international public policy and 5) that the decision was free of
fraud. 53 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (R.C.D.I.P.) 344 (1964).

104. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1288-89. The adoption by several states of versions
of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act (1962) may mitigate this reaction to some
degree. However, such a result is merely speculative and would be limited to those states with
the uniform legislation. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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which involve the U.S. 0 5 Americans had been optimistic, before the
EEC Judgments Convention went into force, that several states
would be inclined to negotiate treaties under article 59.1o6 This hope,
however, has not been borne out. In general, little effort has been
expended in negotiating treaties under article 59. Moreover, future
negotiations will probably be difficult as few states share the same
jurisdictional laws, and thus treaties will require much compromise.
The recent convention between the United Kingdom and Canada 01°
should not dispel this impression, as the experience of the United
States and United Kingdom demonstrated.
The United States' only effort to conclude an agreement under
article 59108 was an approach to the United Kingdom in the early
seventies. An ad referendum text was initialled in 1976.109 The negotiations had been lengthy, and skillfully executed on both sides.1 10
However, differences between these two common law countries
proved insurmountable, and on May 14, 1980, the British informed
the State Department that, for the time being, an agreement could
no longer be reached."' Foremost among the vast differences between the United Kingdom and the United States lay British wariness of large American money judgments. This apprehension led the
powerful British insurance industry to voice the most vehement and
effective objections to the negotiated draft."' In addition, the British
wanted to except American antitrust judgments from the proposed
agreement, which displeased American negotiators. " 3 In fact, the
extraterritorial exercise of antitrust and competition powers by
American courts and agencies had contributed significantly to a general decay in American-British forensic relations in recent years." 4
In response, the British have gone so far as to enact a retaliatory
provision in this area." 5 Obviously, a convention under article 59
105. Present research reveals that the only such treaty concerning the United States was
never concluded. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
106. In fact, Germany and Norway had already done so by the time this Convention
was signed. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1287.
107. This Convention incorporated Article 59 obligations, and was signed on April 24,
1984. Mathers, The Brussels Convention of 1968: Its Implementation in the United Kingdom,
3 Y.B. EUR. L. 49, 78 n.152 (1984).
108. Kerr, supra note 4, at 357.
109. Proposed Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, Oct. 26, 1976, United Kingdom-United States, as discussed in von
Mehren, supra note 54, at 1060 n.61.
110. von Mehren, supra note 54, at 1060 n.61.
11l.Id.
112. Kerr, supra note 4, at 357.
113. Id. For an example as to why the United Kingdom desired this exception, see the
l.C.I.-Dupont-Nylon Spinners cases, in which the English courts resisted an American attempt
to enforce antitrust law extraterritorially. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 453-65 (2d ed. 1981).
114. Kerr, supra note 4, at 357.
115. Id.
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would be no mean accomplishment even when negotiated between
two friendly and jurisprudentially related nations.
Although the wording of article 59 makes it difficult to conclude
effective agreements, there may be additional reasons behind the
United States' failure to do so. The United States' very liberal approach"' in recognizing foreign judgments may have weakened the
American bargaining position as to the EEC countries and article
59. There may have been overabundance of faith on the part of the
United States that other states would follow the American practice
of liberal recognition, and too little energy in the pursuit of protection from the EEC Judgments Convention's enforcement of exorbitantly based judgments. The ideal of comity is a worthy one, but this
alone has not served to protect American litigants." 7
VI.

Policy Recommendations

A different approach to the problem of enforcement of judgments by both American and foreign governments would markedly
improve the United States' position. Eventually, the United States
will be forced to conclude mutual recognition conventions with the
EEC states, and the agreements must include article 59 obligations
on the part of these states. Given this situation, two basic changes in
the United States' policy would undoubtedly improve its leverage in
the negotiation of these treaties. First, the United States must make
greater efforts in this area. Second, the United States must adopt
national legislation clarifying its position on exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, which state by state enactment of uniform legislation has
failed to do." 8
European courts may be justifiably uneasy about accepting
state, rather than federal, legislation as proof of reciprocity. Although sixteen states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money
Judgments Recognition Act, there has been a tendency on the part
of some states to make changes in the act upon adoption. 1" 9 Europeans may still be suspicious of this mixed collection of statutes enacted by a minority of states, each in effect providing for reciprocity
with only one fiftieth of the United States.
Thus, the United States should enact some form of federal reciprocity standard as a condition for its enforcement of foreign judg116. Nadelmann, supra note 53, at 1288-89.
117. Id. at 1290-91.
118. Id.
119. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 1962 13 Uniform Laws
Annotated 261-75 (1962) [hereinafter UFMJRA]. The most substantial changes are reciprocity requirements by some states. Id. at § 4. Georgia also limits the possibility of recognition of
"other bases of jurisdiction", i.e., those not specified in the UFMJRA to non-business contexts.
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-110 to 9-12-117.
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ments. The United Kingdom opted for this solution as early as
1933.120 In turn, a show of concern about this issue by the federal
government would more likely inspire greater European receptiveness to American needs under article 4 of the EEC Judgments
Convention.
Moreover, the United States has other bargaining tools at its
disposal. Certain American common law bases of jurisdiction are as
troublesome to the civil law attorney as exorbitant bases of jurisdiction are to the common law attorney. The United States could seek
to reach an agreement limiting judgments against EEC domiciliaries
based upon common law transient jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over a
corporation "doing business" in a forum state, in exchange for similar limitations upon the use of EEC article 4.121
A bilateral convention under article 59 is the most obvious and
straightforward objective which the U.S. could pursue. One proposal
has suggested that the conclusion of "shell," or "most favored nation" conventions, would be most useful in this context. 22 A "shell"
convention would simply contain two components. First, there would
be an agreement to recognize and enforce the other country's judgments to the same extent as any other country's judgment would be
recognized and enforced. Second, there would be an agreement not
to recognize exorbitantly based judgments. By virtue of their simplicity, these "shell" agreements could be concluded without any difficulty. "Shell" agreements have the potential of being challenged as
falling short of being "conventions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments" within the proper meaning of article 59. However, these agreements would probably withstand such a challenge in
123
the EEC Court of Justice.
Multilateral conventions provide an improbable solution, as
much more effort would be required for their negotiation than the
United States has been willing to make thus far. Furthermore, it is
likely that any such convention would, like the Hague Draft, be unable to engender the support of the EEC countries unless exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction were not barred by its terms. Nor does a revival
of the Hague draft appear feasible. Although the United States,
Sweden and the United Kingdom reserved the right to reopen discussion of the relation between the Supplementary Protocol and the
120. See Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee Report, 1932 CMD
No. 4213; and Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch.
13, § 9, as cited in Nadelmann, supra note 52, at 1290.
121. The "doing business" test is not a sufficient ground for jurisdiction in civil law. See
Carl, supra note 12, at 447.
122. Kerr, supra note 4, at 357.
123. Id.
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Hague Draft, 2 " the United Kingdom is now a member of the EEC,
and thus it would be inconsistent for it to support a mandatory protocol. In any case, the best efforts of Sweden and the United States
would not be sufficient to overcome the will of the EEC, now far
larger than it was when it commanded a majority vote at the Hague
in 1966.125 The Hague Draft would thus provide an unsatisfactory
solution when confronted with the EEC Judgments Convention.
VII.

Conclusion

Even Europeans consider exorbitant bases of jurisdiction to be
unfair. This is clear both from their long tradition of treaty making
and from the fact that the EEC Judgments Convention protects
EEC domiciliaries from their use. Yet the EEC Judgments Convention perpetuates the potential of exorbitantly based decisions against
parties domiciled outside the EEC. As yet, the fears of non-member
states over the past two decades have gone unrealized.' 2 6 Though no
EEC country has yet enforced an exorbitantly based judgment, the
Community itself has intentionally kept that possibility alive. As the
EEC becomes larger,' 27 the potential threat of the EEC Judgments
Convention's exorbitantly based jurisdiction grows proportionately.
It is thus imperative that the interests of international commerce and individual rights be protected against bases of jurisdiction
which the EEC member states themselves regard as intolerable. The
conclusion of bilateral agreements under article 59 of the EEC Judgments Convention is currently the only vehicle by which non-member states can protect those domiciled outside the EEC. In addition
to pursuing these agreements, the United States should adopt a
clear, unified position from which to negotiate. Given the general
dormancy of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction in the EEC, perhaps a
renewed and vigorous pursuit of protective agreements will not be
unrewarded.

124. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 4.
127. Greece became the tenth member in 1981. See Convention on the Accession of the
Hellenic Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy
Community ... , 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 7442 (May 28, 1974), as reprinted in BIi
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 2, at BI 1-448. Spain and Portugal became members on January 1, 1986. See Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of
Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Atomic Energy Community, 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH)
7703, as reprinted in BIi ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW, supra note 2, at BI 1-645. Greece's accession to the Judgments Convention on October
25, 1982 (Convention on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Luxembourg, Oct.
25, 1982, O.J. EUR. COMM., L388, (1982) is not yet in force. Spain and Portugal have not yet
concluded treaties of accession to the judgment convention. The United Kingdom, Denmark
and Ireland acceded in 1978, see supra notes 55, 89.

